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ARGUMENT1
As stated in the principal briefs, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102 (1) provides:
A therapist has no duty to warn or take precautions to provide protection from any
violent behavior of his client or patient, except when that client or patient
communicated to the therapist an actual threat of physical violence against a
clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim. That duty shall be discharged
if the therapist makes reasonable efforts to communicate the threat to the victim,
and notifies a law enforcement officer or agency of the threat.
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the statute, which precludes the
imposition of a duty "to warn or take precautions to provide protection from" the violent
behavior of a client except under certain circumstances, also eliminates a therapist's duty
of reasonable care when she undertakes an affirmative act.
Appellants discussed at length in their initial brief the material difference between
seeking to impose liability for a failure to act and seeking to impose liability for
negligently performing an affirmative act. (See Brief of Appellants, pp. 11-13.) By its
terms, Section 78-14a-102(1) applies only to the former; it precludes the imposition of an
affirmative duty of a therapist to act, except under specific circumstances. Nowhere does
it address, let alone eliminate, a therapist's duty to act reasonably when she does act.
The Clinic implicitly recognizes this distinction, arguing that affirmatively
misrepresenting a fact is really just a failure "to ensure the completeness and accuracy of

1

The Clinic begins its brief with a summary of facts from the plaintiffs' complaint. On
appeal from a motion to dismiss, the appellants are entitled to have the matter decided
based on all allegations in the complaint, along with reasonable inferences therefrom.
Accordingly, the dispositive facts are those set forth in the Robinsons' opening brief.
1

information. . . . "[T]he 'essence and substance' of Plaintiffs' claim here is that Ms.
Harris should have taken precautions to protect Plaintiffs which she did not take,
'ascertaining whether the patient was carrying a concealed weapon/ and responding
accurately to the dispatcher's question." (Brief of Appellee, pp. 4, 6-7.)
The Clinic's theory would eviscerate the long line of Utah authority distinguishing
nonfeasance and misfeasance. Performing an affirmative act unreasonably would simply
be recharacterized as a "failure to act" reasonably. The Clinic's argument is like saying
that driving one's car into a pedestrian is really a failure to act because it involves a
failure to apply one's brakes. The argument does not pass the common-sense test.
The wording of Section 78-14a-102(1) is unambiguous, and does not address or
limit liability for acts of affirmative negligence. Because the statutory language is plain,
the inquiry should go no further. Appellants note, however, that a memorandum in the
legislative history file appears to make clear that the statute was intended solely to address
claims of nonfeasance. See Addendum Exh. A hereto.2
According to the Legislative Memorandum, Section 78-14a-102 was enacted in
response to a California Supreme Court decision, Tarasoffv. Regents of the University of
California, 17 Cal.3d 425, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334 (1976). See also Michael R.
Gerske, "Statutes Limiting Mental Health Professionals' Liability for the Violent Acts of

2

The bill was originally proposed in 1987 by Rep. Irby Arrington, but was not passed
until 1988. The memorandum was prepared for the 1987 session, but because the 1988
bill was "identical," it is instructive as to legislative intent with respect to that bill as well.
2

their Patients,55 64 Ind L. J. 391, 392 n.5 (Spring 1988/1989) (identifying Utah as one of
ten states enacting legislation to counteract Tarasoff).

In Tarasoff, the California

Supreme Court held that a "special relationship55 existed between a therapist and a thirdparty victim if the therapist knew "or should have known55 that his patient posed a threat
to the third party. Accordingly, the court held, a duty to warn the victim existed.
Tarasoff "created an exception to the general rule under the common law, which
states that a person does not have an affirmative duty to act to protect others even if
action by a particular person is necessary to prevent harm.55

Allison L. Almason,

"Personal Liability Implications of the Duty to Warn are Hard Pills to Swallow: From
Tarasoff to Hutchinson v. Patel and Beyond,5513J. Contemp. Health. L. & Poly 471, 474
(Spring 1997) (noting that Tarasoff creates "liability for nonfeasance55 by finding the
existence of a "special relationship55).
The Legislative Memorandum stated (with underlining in the original), "This bill,
and similar statutes in other states is designed to define a therapist's duty to warn and take
precautions, when a threat has been made, and to reasonably limit his liability if he fulfills
that duty.55 The Memorandum attached a copy of California's post-Tarasoff statute, Cal.
Civil Code § 43.92, which contained wording similar to that enacted in Utah. Id.
What California's statute (and Utah's Section 78-14a-102) accomplished was the
preclusion of any alleged duty to warn where a therapist merely "should have known" of
a threat, but does not have actual knowledge. See Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d
864, 120 Cal.App.4th 807 (discussing history of California's post- Tarasoff statute; stating
3

that "Section 43.92 . . . eliminates the 'should have determined' component and provides
immunity to therapists for failure to warn, except where the plaintiff can show that the
patient actually communicated to his therapist a serious threat of physical violence against
an identifiable victim").
In addition to California's law, the Legislative Memorandum noted that similar
statutes had been enacted in Colorado, New Hampshire, Kentucky, and Louisiana.
Consistent with their origins, courts in those jurisdictions characterize their versions of
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102 as "duty to warn" statutes. See, e.g., Halverson v. Pikes
Peak Family Counseling and Mental Health Center, 795 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Colo. App.
1990) (characterizing § 13-21-117, C.R.S. (as "granting] immunity from liability to
health care providers for their failure to warn others of a patient's dangerous propensities
or his generalized threats of violence against unspecified persons"); Dunnington v. Silva,
916 So.2d 1166, 1168 -69 (La. App. 2005) (characterizing LSA-R.S. 9:2800.2 as a "duty
to warn" statute); Powell v. Catholic Medical Center, 145 N. H. 7, 749 A.2d 301 (2000)
(stating, with regard to N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 329:31, that "[t]he subject matter
embraced by RSA 329:31 is limited to a physician's duty to warn of a client's violent
behavior when the client has communicated a serious threat of physical violence against a
clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim").
Section 78-14a-102(1) is a duty-to-warn statute. This is not a duty-to-warn case.
The statute simply does not apply. Ironically, however, it does lend indirect support to
the Robinsons' contention that the legislature did not intend to immunize the negligent
4

performance of an existing duty. In the final sentence of Section 78- 14a-102(1), the
statute provides that, when a duty to warn has arisen, the therapist is required to act
reasonably in fulfilling it.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(1) (therapist must make

"reasonable efforts" to warn upon receipt of specific threat). The same principle applies
here: A duty, once it has arisen, must be performed non-negligently.
In arguing that Section 78-14a-102(1) should immunize alleged affirmative
negligence, the Clinic cites Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416 (Utah 1998).
In that case, the plaintiffs sued Valley Mental Health, alleging that the clinic owed their
daughter and grandson a duty to warn and/or protect them from the violent actions of a
patient whom it misdiagnosed as non-threatening.

"They argue that because Valley

-5

Another reason why it makes little sense to apply Section 78-14a-102 in this case is that
accurately reporting whether a person has a weapon or not, or that it is unknown whether
the person has a weapon, does not involve the application of medical training or skill.
The fact that the employee making the phone call happens to be a therapist rather than the
receptionist is largely fortuitous. The New Hampshire Supreme Court made a similar
observation in Powell, supra. After concluding that a duty to warn existed under its
statute, the court rejected the defendant's argument that his compliance with that duty
should be measured by a "reasonable professional" standard, rather than a "reasonable
person" standard. Once a duty of reasonable care existed, the court said, it was "an
ordinary duty of care case. It is only fortuitous that one of the defendants is a physician.
Specialized training and experience do not excuse a physician from exercising the
reasonable care of an ordinary person." 749 A.2d at 306. See also Geske, 64 Ind L. J. at
417-418 ("The task of warning or taking precautions against a person's violent behavior
presupposed no particular professional skill or training. . . . Any person faced with a
threat which triggers the statutory duty could be expected to choose a reasonable response
to the threat to protect an identifiable person. . . . Requiring a professional to choose
reasonably among alternative warnings or precautions to protect reasonably identifiable
persons depending on the circumstances demands no more from the professional than the
reasonable care required of all persons in carrying out their legal duties.")
5

Mental Helth failed to treat Kilgrow it failed to discover the threat to Jayleen and the
children/' the Court summarized. "Therefore, a duty to Jayleen and her children exists
under the common law because Valley Mental Health should have known of the threat
Kilgrow posed." Id. at 419.
The Wilsons' claims were barred by Section 78-14a-102(1), the Court held,
because the statute eliminated the common law extension of a duty to warn in situations
where a therapist merely "should have known" of a danger. "[U]nder our case law a duty
may . . . exist where a therapist 'should have known' of the danger to a clearly identified
or reasonably identifiable victim," the Wilson court explained. "That is, our case law may
allow the imposition of a duty where, because of the defendant's negligent treatment, a
threat to a reasonably identifiable victim is not discovered." Id. at 420.
The statute, by contrast, narrowed the circumstances under which such a duty
could be imposed. "[T]he statute requires actual knowledge of a threat to a reasonably
identifiable victim," the Court wrote. "There is no liability under the statute where the
claim is that a therapist 'should have known' of the threat to a clearly identified or
reasonably identifiable victim." Id.
It was uncontroverted in Wilson that the patient had not communicated a specific
threat, the Court noted. Under the statute, therefore, no duty to warn the daughter or
grandson existed, and the plaintiff could not impose such a duty by arguing that a "special
relationship" existed between the parties. Wilson has no bearing on the Robinsons' claim
in this case.
6

The Clinic also argues that Boon v. Rivera, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 276, 80 Cal.App.4th
1322 (2000), which recognized a common law duty of reasonable care when requesting
the services of law enforcement, is distinguishable. The Clinic states that Boon focused
on the existence of a specific threat to an identifiable party. That portion of the court's
analysis, however, related to the plaintiffs "special relationship" argument, which the
court said was irrelevant to claims of affirmative negligence. 80 Cal.App.4th at 1332.
See also Gilger v. Hernandez, 2000 UT 23, ^ 20, 997 P.3d 305 ("An act of misfeasance
may constitute actionable negligence without reliance on a special relationship to impose
an affirmative duty to act."). The Clinic does not dispute the separate holding in Boon
that, under the common law, a person has a duty not to negligently misrepresent material
facts to law enforcement.
The Clinic also notes that the California Court of Appeal declined to apply Boon in
Alvarez v. Jacmar Pacific Pizza Corp., Ill

Cal.Rptr.2d 890, 100 Cal.App.4th 1190

(2002). In Alvarez, the defendant called 911 and "did not provide information to the
police which may have been pertinent to their deciding how to handle the situation." Id.
Thus, the defendant's alleged negligence was not saying something. In that context, the
Court of Appeal correctly distinguished Boon and another California Supreme Court
decision, Garcia v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.3d 728, 268 Cal.Rptr. 779, 789 P.2d 960
(1990), because those cases involved allegations of affirmative acts rather than
nonfeasance - the very distinction argued by appellants in this case.
Cal.Rptr.4th at 1213.
7

See id., 100

Garcia further illustrates the point. In that case, the supreme court upheld a
negligence cause of action against a parole officer who falsely told a potential victim that
a released criminal posed no threat to her. The court rejected the defendant's argument
that he owed no duty to inform the victim of a parolee's dangerousness. "Ordinarily, of
course, law enforcement personnel have no duty to volunteer information about released
criminals under their supervision," the court agreed. "Nevertheless, the absence of a duty
to speak does not entitle one to speak falsely. . . . [W]e conclude that Ybarra, having
chosen to communicate information about Johnson to Morales, had a duty to use
reasonable care in doing so." Id, 789 P.2d at 964.
The Clinic next argues that, "Although Plaintiffs characterize Ms. Harris'
statement that the patient did not have a gun as an 'affirmative misrepresentation,' they
cannot allege she actually knew that the patient had concealed a gun on his person."
(Brief of Appellee, p. 9.) That is similar to the claim in Garcia. No allegation was made
there that the parole officer actually knew that a threat existed and lied about it. In this
case, even under the Clinic's theory, the reasonable - the accurate - response would have
been, "I don't know," rather than a positive assurance that the patient did not have a
weapon. To a law enforcement officer (or anyone, really), there is a material difference
between being told there is a possibility of a weapon and being told there is no weapon.
Finally, the Clinic argues that it would be "poor policy" to require a defendant to
act reasonably when providing information to law enforcement. (Brief of Appellee, p.
11.) "Rather, public policy is served when therapists needing assistance in potentially
8

dangerous situations are encouraged to summon aid from police who are trained to deal
with such situations, regardless of how the call for assistance might be characterized after
the fact," appellee argues. Id.
It must be remembered that all the Robinsons are asking, and all that other courts
require, is reasonableness under the circumstances. How can it be good public policy to
allow unreasonable behavior when making statements upon which law enforcement will
rely? Rather, appellants submit that the public policy arguments in this case cut in their
favor. Shouldn't the courts adopt a position that prevents law enforcement officers from
being unnecessarily placed in harm's way by requiring that reasonably accurate
information be provided to them?
With respect to "how the call for assistance might be characterized after the fact,"
that is a question for the factfinder. A jury will consider the individual circumstances of
each particular case, including any extenuating circumstances cited by the defendant.
See, e.g., Jorgensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80 (Utah App. 1987) (upholding jury finding of 50
percent comparative fault even though the plaintiff was confronted with an emergency
created by the defendant) ("The jury, pursuant to those instructions, apparently found that
under the circumstances appellant was negligent in failing to reasonably keep his vehicle
under control and/or maintain a reasonably safe speed. The finding of negligence took
into account, as part of the circumstances, that appellant was suddenly confronted with
defendants vehicle straddling the center line."). (Emphasis in original.)

9

CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in applying Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(1) to claims based
upon affirmative misconduct. Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court to reverse the trial
court's judgment and remand the case for trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thisofl

day of May, 2007.

CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

William J. Hansen
Karra J. Porter
Attorneys for Appellants
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